It {Nas defined by two of its originators as follows:
Large interactive systems perpetually organize themselves to a critical state in whcb a minor event starts a chain reaction that can lead to a catastrophe . . Although composfte systems produce more minor even& than catastropbe~ chain reackions of all sizes are an integral part of the dynamics. . FuJchermore, composite systems never reach equii?bnum but instead evolve from oqe temporarily stable state to the next2 Tie ttntest devlafions at the begmnng of a motion can lead to huge dtferences at later times-in other words; mtnuscule causes can produce enormous effects affer a certain time interval. Of course we know from everyday life that this IS occastonally the case; the tnvesttgat/on of dynamical systems has shown us that this IS @pical of natural processes. an extent that they must be ranked among 1.3 principal causes. He had seen things go suddenly wrong, for the most insignificant and unanticipated events, a+ the causes always eluded him. The modern theory of Chaos tells us that this IS preordained. A system as complex as a modern (or a lgth century) army will inevitably be affected. At the tactical and operational level plans cannot possibly be used for anythrng other than a way to get started. The requirements for genius in the commander, the abilitv to react to the change in circumstance, will remain paramount. As Clausewitz described it, it consisted of the " harmonious What once were random actions now ofien can be predicted and controlled. Armies can foresee far more than before, and execute their tntenuons far better.
i-bus, the effect of 'forfune'on war has declined along with Its plaustbtlrty as an excuse for defeat 'Fortune; so long queen of the battlefield, has been dethroned by a pawn . Indeed, mrlitary genlus &elf may actually be counterproductive In an era of excel/lent and reliable rntellrgence, Geniuses _ often make a fetfsh of faith in their intuition.
They fail to grasp that chaos theory teaches us that It IS the more complex &terns that are most affected by unforeseen events that no amount of lntelllgence can prepare you for. The complexity of a modern army's C?, hlgh- 7i9e mechants& view IS too arbitraary and srmple for international affairs. We must start from the point that disorder, proceeding to reordering, IS an inherent, inescapable feature of complex, interactive systems. We are deluding ourselves if we choose metaphors which suggest that externally-imposeed, long-term stabky can be a defining feature of the world. The world IS destined to be chaotic /Me can learn to see chaos and reordering as opportuntties, and not push for stab&y as an illusory end tn i&e/f All of this awaits if we can transcend the bpnds of the mecbamstic framework, which stall dominates strategic tbougbt .
There remains much work to be done in analyzrng the effects of Chaos Theory at the strategtc, operatlonal and tactical level of war. It will remain Imperative to avoid dependence on sequential plans, with genius impaired cor;nmanders given the task of execution. As Dwight Eisenhower reminds us "planning IS essential, but plans are useless." War will remain an art, with the mqst creative and enterpnslng commanders able to achieve victory. We would do weil to remember Clausewltz's advice on the qualities we should seek for those who lead our armies. " The man responsible for evaluating the whole must bring to HIS task the quality of Intuition that perceives the truth at every point Otherwise a chaos of opinions and considerations would arise, and fatally entangle judgement Everything in war IS very simple, but the simplest thing IS I difficult."
